Privacy and security concerns can prevent sharing of data, derailing data mining projects. Distributed knowledge discovery, if done correctly, can alleviate this problem. The key is to obtain valid results, while providing guarantees on the (non)disclosure of data. We present a method for k-means clustering when different sites contain different attributes for a common set of entities. Each site learns the cluster of each entity, but learns nothing about the attributes at other sites.
INTRODUCTION
Data mining and privacy are often perceived to be at odds, witness the recent U.S. Senate proposal of a "Data Mining Moratorium Act" [11] . Data mining results rarely violate privacy, as they generally reveal high-level knowledge rather than disclosing instances of data. However, the concern among privacy advocates is well founded, as bringing data together to support data mining makes misuse easier. The problem is not data mining, but the way data mining is done.
Imagine the following scenario. A law enforcement agency wants to cluster individuals based on their financial transactions, and study the differences between the clusters and known money laundering operations. Knowing the differences and similarities between normal individuals and known money launderers would enable better direction of investigations. Currently, an individual's financial transactions may be divided between banks, credit card companies, tax collection agencies, etc. Each of these (presumably) has effective controls governing release of the information. These controls are not perfect, but violating them (either technologically or through insider misuse) reveals only a subset of an individual's financial records. The law enforcement agency could promise to provide effective controls, but overcoming these controls now gives access to an individual's entire financial history. This raises justifiable concerns among privacy advocates.
Privacy and data mining can coexist. The problem with the above scenario is not the data mining results, but how they are obtained. Current U.S. regulations require banks to report certain transactions (e.g., large cash deposits), but law enforcement does not have full access to accounts. If the results were obtained without sharing information, between the data sources, and the results could not be used to deduce private information, data mining would not reduce privacy. Using these results to devise more effective regulations on what transactions must be reported could actually improve both privacy and the ability to detect criminal activity.
While obtaining globally meaningful results without sharing information may seem impossible, it can be done. Algorithms have been developed to efficiently solve several types of distributed computations in a secure manner. This paper presents a method for k-means clustering in scenarios like the above, demonstrating how results from secure multiparty computation can be used to generate privacypreserving data mining algorithms. We assume vertically partitioned data: The data for a single entity are split across multiple sites, and each site has information for all the entities for a specific subset of the attributes. We assume that the existence of an entity in a particular site's database may be revealed, it is the values associated with an entity that are private. The goal is to cluster the known set of common entities without revealing any of the values that the clustering is based on.
K-means clustering [9, 13] is a simple technique to group items into k clusters. The basic idea behind k-means clus- tors is 0. Each site adds its local differences |point − µi| to its vector. At the same time, the vector is permuted in an order known only to A. Each site (except a single holdout) sends their permuted vector to site B. Site B sums the received vectors, then the holdout site and B perform a series of secure additions and comparisons to find the minimum i without learning distances. B now asks A the real index corresponding to i, giving the proper cluster for the point.
The second problem is knowing when to quit, i.e., when the difference between µ and µ is small enough; we show how to privately compute this in Algorithm 2. This makes use of secure sum and secure comparison, described in Section 2.3. We will begin with details of the algorithm. We will introduce background work as necessary, particularly in the security discussion of Section 3. We discuss mitigating the risks from colluding parties in Section 4, and communication cost in Section 5. We conclude with a discussion of related work, as well as suggestions for future research.
PRIVACY PRESERVING K-MEANS AL-GORITHM
We now formally define the problem. Let r be the number of parties, each having different attributes for the same set of entities. n is the number of the common entities. The parties wish to cluster their joint data using the k-means algorithm. Let k be the number of clusters required.
The final result of the k-means clustering algorithm is the value/position of the means of the k clusters, with each side only knowing the means corresponding to their own attributes, and the final assignment of entities to clusters. Let each cluster mean be represented as µi, i = 1, . . . , k. Let µij represent the projection of the mean of cluster i on party j. Thus, the final result for party j is
• the final value/position of µij , i = 1 . . . k
• cluster assignments: clusti for all points (i = 1, . . . , n)
The k-means algorithm also requires an initial assignment (approximation) for the values/positions of the k means. This is an important issue, as the choice of initial points determines the final solution. Research has led to mechanisms producing a good initial assignment [4] . Their technique uses classic k-means clustering done over multiple subsamples of the data, followed by clustering the results to get the initial points. For simplicity, we assume that the k means are selected arbitrarily. Since the underlying operations in [4] involve k-means clustering, it is quite easy to extend our algorithm to search for and start off with good initial means.
Thus, for i = 1 . . . k, every party selects its share µ ij of any given mean. This value is local to each party and is unknown to the other parties.
The basic algorithm directly follows the standard k-means algorithm. The approximations to the true means are iteratively refined until the improvement in one iteration is below a threshold. At each iteration, every point is assigned to the proper cluster, i.e., we securely find the cluster with the minimum distance for each point (this is described in Section 2.1.) Once these mappings are known, the local components of each cluster mean can be computed locally. We then use Algorithm 2 (checkT hreshold) to test termination: was the improvement to the mean approximation in that iteration below a threshold? This is shown formally in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Privacy Preserving k-means clustering
Require: r parties, k clusters, n points.
1: for all sites j = 1 . . . r do 2: for all clusters i = 1 . . . k do 3:
initialize µ ij arbitrarily 4: end for 5: end for 6: repeat 7:
for all j = 1 . . . r do 8:
µij ← µ ij 10:
end for 12:
end for 13:
for g = 1 . . . n do 14:
for all j = 1 . . . r do 15:
{Compute the distance vector Xj (to each cluster) for point g.} 16:
for i = 1 . . . k do 17: 
end for 6: end for 7: {Securely compute if dj ≤ T h.} 8: At P1: m = rand() 9: for j=1 . . . r-1 do 10:
Pi sends m + dj (mod n) to Pj+1 11: end for 12: At Pr: m = m + dr 13: At P1: T h = T h + r 14: P1 and Pr return secure add and compare(m − T h (mod n) > T h − m (mod n)) {Secure comparison is described in Section 2.3.}
The checkT hreshold algorithm (Algorithm 2) is straightforward, except that to maintain security (and practicality) all arithmetic must be modn. This results in a nonobvious threshold evaluation at the end, consisting of a secure addition/comparison. Intervals are compared rather than the actual numbers. Since T h < n/2 and the domain of −D < n/2, if the result of m−T h is positive, it will be less than n/2, and if it is negative, due to the modulo operation, it will be greater than n/2. Thus, m−T h > T h −m(modn) if and only if m < T h , and the correct result is returned.
Securely Finding the Closest Cluster
This algorithm is used as a subroutine in the k-means clustering algorithm to privately find the cluster which is closest to the given point, i.e., which cluster should a point be assigned to. Thus, the algorithm is invoked for every single data point in each iteration. Each party has as its input the component of the distance corresponding to each of the k clusters. This is equivalent to having a matrix of distances of dimension k × r. For common distance metrics; such as Euclidean, Manhattan, or Minkowski; this translates to finding the cluster where the sum of the local distances is the minimum among all the clusters.
The problem is formally defined as follows. Consider r parties P1, . . . , Pr, each with their own k-element vector Xi:
. . .
The goal is to compute the index l that represents the row with the minimum sum. Formally, find
For use in k-means clustering, xij = |µij − pointj |, or site Pj 's component of the distance between a point and the cluster i with mean µi. The security of the algorithm is based on three key ideas.
1. Disguise the site components of the distance with random values that cancel out when combined.
2. Compare distances so only the comparison result is learned; no party knows the distances being compared.
3. Permute the order of clusters so the real meaning of the comparison results is unknown.
The algorithm also requires three non-colluding sites. These parties may be among the parties holding data, but could be external as well. They need only know the number of sites r and the number of clusters k. Assuming they do not collude with each other, they learn nothing from the algorithm. For simplicity of presentation, we will assume the non-colluding sites are P1, P2, and Pr among the data holders. Using external sites, instead of participating sites P1, P2 and Pr, to be the non-colluding sites, is trivial. The algorithm proceeds as follows. Site P1 generates a length k random vector Vi for each site i, such that r i=1 Vi = 0. P1 also chooses a permutation π of 1..k. P1 then engages each site Pi in the permutation algorithm (see Section 2.2) to generate the sum of the vector Vi and Pi's distances Xi.
The resulting vector is known only to Pi, and is permuted by π known only to P1, i.e., Pi has π( Vi + Xi), but does not know π or Vi. P1 and P3 . . . Pr−1 send their vectors to Pr.
Sites P2 and Pr now engage in a series of secure addition / comparisons to find the (permuted) index of the minimum distance. Specifically, they want to find if
xmi, showing which cluster (l or m) is closest to the point. Pr has all components of the sum except X2 + V2. For each comparison, we use a secure circuit evaluation (see Section 2.3) that calculates a2 + ar < b2 + br, without disclosing anything but the comparison result. After k − 1 such comparisons, keeping the minimum each time, the minimum cluster is known.
P2 and Pr now know the minimum cluster in the permutation π. They do not know the real cluster it corresponds to (or the cluster that corresponds to any of the others items in the comparisons.) For this, they send the minimum i back to site P1. P1 broadcasts the result π −1 (i), the proper cluster for the point.
The full algorithm is given in Algorithm 3. Several opti-
Algorithm 3 closest cluster: Find minimum distance cluster
Require: r parties, each with a length k vector X of distances. Three of these parties (trusted not to collude) are labeled P1, P2, and Pr. 1: {Stage 1: Between P1 and all other parties} 2: P1 generates r random vectors Vi summing to 0 (see Algorithm 4). 3: P1 generates a random permutation π over k elements 4: for all i = 2 . . . r do 5:
Ti (at Pi) = add and permute( Vi, π(at P1), Xi(at Pi)) {This is the permutation algorithm described in Section 2.2} 6: end for 7: P1 computes T1 = π( X1 + V1) 8: 9: {Stage 2: Between all but P2 and Pr} 10: for all i = 1, 3 . . . r − 1 do 11:
Pi sends Ti to Pr 12: end for 13: mizations are possible, we discuss these when analyzing the complexity of the algorithm in Section 5. We now describe the two key building blocks borrowed from the Secure Multiparty Computation literature. We first give the permutation algorithm. We then describe the secure addition compariAlgorithm 4 genRandom: Generates a (somewhat) random matrix V k×r Require: Random number generator rand producing values uniformly distributed over 0..n − 1 spanning (at least) the domain of the distance function −D. Ensure: The sum of the resulting vectors is 0.
1: for all i = 1 . . . k do 2: P artSumi ← 0 3:
for j = 2 . . . r do 4:
Vij ← rand() 5:
P artSumi ← P artSumi + Vij (mod n) 6: end for 7:
Vi1 ← −P artSumi (mod n) 8: end for son, which builds a circuit that has two inputs from each party, sums the first input of both parties and the second input of both parties, and returns the result of comparing the two sums. This (simple) circuit is evaluated securely using the generic algorithm described in Section 2.3. Following these, we will prove the security of the method. A graphical depiction of stages 1 and 2 is given in Figures 2 and 3.
Permutation Algorithm
The secure permutation algorithm developed by Du and Atallah simultaneously computes a vector sum and permutes the order of the elements in the vector. We repeat the idea here for completeness, for more details see [7] . We do present a more formal proof of the security of the algorithm than that in [7] , this is given as part of the overall security proof of our algorithm in Section 3.2.
The permutation problem is an asymmetric two party algorithm, formally defined as follows. There exist 2 parties, A and B. B has an n-dimensional vector X = (x1, . . . , xn), and A has an n-dimensional vector V = (v1, . . . , vn). A also has a permutation π of the n numbers. The goal is to give B the result π( X + V ), without disclosing anything else. In particular, neither A nor B can learn the other's vector, and B does not learn π. For our purposes, the V is a vector of random numbers from a uniform random distribution, used to hide the permutation of the other vector.
The solution makes use of a tool known as Homomorphic Encryption. An encryption function H : R → S is called additively homomorphic if there is an efficient algorithm Plus to compute H(x + y) from H(x) and H(y) that does not reveal x or y. Many such systems exist; examples include systems by Benaloh [3] , Naccache and Stern [24] , Okamoto and Uchiyama [25] , and Paillier [26] . This allows us to perform addition of encrypted data without decrypting it.
The permutation algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. B generates a public-private keypair (E k , D k ) for a homomorphic encryption scheme.
2. B encrypts its vector X to generate the encrypted vec-
3. B sends X and the public key E k to A.
A encrypts its vector V generating the encrypted vector
V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), v i = E k (vi).
5.
A now multiplies the components of the vectors X and V to get T = (t 1 , . . . , t n ),
Due to the homomorphic property of the encryption,
6. A applies the permutation π to the vector T to get T p = π( T ), and sends T p to B.
7.
B decrypts the components of T p giving the final result Tp = (tp 1 , . . . , tp n ), tp i = xp i + vp i .
General Secure Multiparty Computation / Secure Comparison
Secure two party computation was first investigated by Yao [29] and was later generalized to multiparty computation. The seminal paper by Goldreich proves that there exists a secure solution for any functionality [15] . The approach used is as follows: the function f to be computed is first represented as a combinatorial circuit, and then the parties run a short protocol for every gate in the circuit. Every participant gets (randomly selected) shares of the input wires and the output wires for every gate. Since determining which share goes to which party is done randomly, a party's own share tells it nothing. Upon completion, the parties exchange their shares, enabling each to compute the final result. This protocol can be proven to both give the desired result and to do so without disclosing anything other than the result. This approach, though appealing in its generality and simplicity, means that the size of the protocol depends on the size of the circuit, which depends on the size of the input. This is impractical for large inputs and many parties, as in data mining. However, for a limited number of simple twoparty operations, such as the secure add and compare function used in Algorithms 2 and 3, the complexity is reasonable. For two parties, the message cost is O(circuit size), and the number of rounds is constant. We can add and compare numbers with O(m = log(number of entities)) bits using an O(m) size circuit.
SECURITY DISCUSSION
We first need to define formally what we mean by secure. For this, we turn to the definitions of Secure Multiparty Computation.
Secure Multi-Party Computation
To prove that our k-means algorithm preserves privacy, we need to define privacy preservation. We use the framework defined in Secure Multiparty Computation.
Yao first postulated the two-party comparison problem (Yao's Millionaire Protocol) and developed a provably secure solution [29] . This was extended to multiparty computations by Goldreich et al. [15] . They developed a framework for secure multiparty computation, and in [14] proved that computing a function privately is equivalent to computing it securely.
We start with the definitions for security in the semihonest model. A semi-honest party follows the rules of the protocol using its correct input, but is free to later use what it sees during execution of the protocol to compromise security. A formal definition of private two-party computation in the semi-honest model is given below. Definition 1. (privacy w.r.t. semi-honest behavior): [14] Let f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * be probabilistic, polynomial-time functionality, where f1 (x, y) (respectively, f2 (x, y)) denotes the first (resp., second) element of f (x, y)); and let Π be two-party protocol for computing f .
Let the view of the first (resp., second) party during an execution of protocol Π on (x, y), denoted view Π 1 (x, y) (resp., view Π 2 (x, y)), be (x, r1, m1, . . . , mt) (resp., (y, r2, m1, . . . , mt)). r1 represent the outcome of the first (resp., r2 the second) party's internal coin tosses, and mi represent the i th message it has received.
The output of the first (resp., second) party during an execution of Π on (x, y) is denoted output Π 1 (x, y) (resp., output Π 2 (x, y)) and is implicit in the party's view of the execution.
Π privately computes f if there exist probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, denoted S1, S2 such that
x,y∈{0,1} * where ≡ C denotes computational indistinguishability.
The above definition states that a computation is secure if the view of each party during the execution of the protocol can be effectively simulated knowing only the input and the output of that party. This is not quite the same as saying that private information is protected. If information can be deduced from the final result, it is obviously not kept private under this definition. For example, if two entities map to different clusters, they must have some attribute values that are different. If one site has exactly the same values for those entities, it has learned the "private" information that those entities have different values in the attributes held by some other site. This cannot be helped, as this information can always be deduced from the result and the site's own input.
A key result we use is the composition theorem. We state it for the semi-honest model. A detailed discussion of this theorem, as well as the proof, can be found in [14] . Proof. Refer to [14] .
Our protocols are somewhat stronger than the semi-honest model. The proofs hold in any situation where the parties do not collude to discover information; a single malicious party may disrupt the results, but cannot learn private information that would not be revealed by the result. This will become apparent in the proofs below.
Permutation Algorithm
The permutation algorithm reveals nothing to A, so A's view must be simulated using only it's own input. B gets the result vector.
Theorem 2. The Permutation Algorithm (Section 2.2) privately computes a permuted vector sum of two vectors, where one party knows the permutation π and the other gets permuted sum π( X + V ).
Proof. A s view:
A receives an encryption key E k and a encrypted vector X of size n. It can simulate the encryption key by generating a single random number from a uniform random distribution. Assuming security of encryption and since A knows the n, the vector X can also be simulated simply by generating n randoms from an uniform distribution. Using its own vector V and the simulated input, the simulator for A can perform steps 4-6 to complete the simulation of A's view.
B s view: The simulator for B performs steps 1 and 2 to generate E k and X . In step 6 B receives a size n vector T p . To simulate T p , B encrypts the components of the result Tp = π( X + V ):
The simulator for both runs in time linear in the size of the input vectors, meeting the requirement for a polynomialtime simulation.
Closest Cluster Computation
Algorithm 3 returns the index of the closest cluster (i.e., the row with the minimum row sum). To prove this algorithm is privacy preserving, we must show that each party can construct a polynomial time simulator for the view that it sees, given only its own input and this closest cluster index.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 3 privately computes the index of the row with the minimum row sum, revealing only this result assuming parties do not collude to expose other information.
Proof. The simulator is constructed in stages, corresponding to the stages of the algorithm.
Stage 1. The only communication occurring in this stage
occurs in the r−1 calls to the Permutation Algorithm. Thus, we simply need to apply the composition theorem stated in Theorem 1, with g being the closest cluster computation algorithm and f being the permutation algorithm. What remains is to show that we can simulate the result Ti. The simulator for P1 is exactly the algorithm used by P1, without sending any data. For the remaining sites, since the vi are unknown and chosen from a uniform distribution on (0..n − 1), vi + xi will also form a uniform distribution on (0..n − 1). Each Pi, i = 2 . . . r can simulate the vector Ti by selecting values randomly from a uniform distribution on (0..n − 1). This is indistinguishable from what it sees in the algorithm.
Stage 2.
All the parties other than P2 and Pr send their permuted result vectors to the receiver. Since only Pr sees new information, we need only concern ourselves with simulating what it sees. The received vectors can be simulated by Pr exactly as they were simulated by the Pi in Stage 1. The vector Y is equal to the actual distances minus T2. However, since T2 consists of values uniformly distributed over (0..n − 1), Y is effectively distances − v, and is thus also uniformly distributed over (0..n − 1). However, we cannot simulate it by generating random values, as we must preserve the relationship Y = T1 + r j=3 Tj (mod n). Fortunately, the sum of the simulator-generated Ti will give a vector Y that both meets this constraint and is uniformly distributed over (0..n − 1), giving a view that is indistinguishable from the real algorithm.
Stage 3.
Here P2 and Pr engage in a series of comparisons.
Again, we use the composition theorem. Each comparison is secure, so we need only show that we can simulate the sequence of comparison results.
The simulator uniformly chooses a random ordering of the k clusters from the k! possible orderings. We regard this as the distance-wise ordering of the clusters relative to the point. This ordering is used to choose the appropriate result, ≤ or >, for each comparison. Effectively, the simulator runs steps 17-21, but makes the comparisons locally based on the random ordering. The probability of any given ordering is 1/k!, the same as the probability of any given ordering achieved after the permutation π in the actual view. Therefore, the probability of any given sequence of comparison results is the same under the ordering as under the view seen in the actual algorithm.
Note that all of the possible 2 (k−1) sequences are not equally likely, e.g., the sequence of all >s corresponds to only one ordering, while the sequence of all ≤s corresponds to (k −1)! orderings. However, selecting random total orderings generates sequences matching the (non-uniform) probability distribution of the actual sequences of comparisons.
Stage 4. Pr (or P2) sends the index i to P1. Since the true index it is the final result known to all the parties, and P1 decides upon the permutation π, the simulator generates π(it) = i as the message it receives.
The final result it is sent to all parties. Since this is the final result, obviously all the parties can simulate it.
Since this simulator is also linear in the size of the input, and we have proven the permutation algorithm to be secure, application of the composition theorem proves that Algorithm 3 preserves privacy.
Stopping Criterion
Before analyzing the security of the entire k -means algorithm, we prove the security of the threshold checking Algorithm 2. Proof. Steps 10 and 14 are the only steps of Algorithm 2 requiring communication, so the simulator runs the algorithm to this point. In step 10, party P1 first sends m + d1 (mod n) where m is the random number known to P1. Each of the parties Pj , j = 2 . . . r receive a message m + i j=1 dj from their left neighbor. Since m is chosen from a uniform distribution on (0 . . . n−1), and all arithmetic is mod n, this sum forms a uniform distribution on (0 . . . n − 1) and can be simulated by generating a random number over that distribution:
The secure add and compare algorithm gives only the fi-
Step 14 is easily simulated knowing that result.
This simulator runs in the O(k) time required by the Algorithm, and is thus polynomial. Applying the composition theorem with Algorithm 2 as f and secure add and compare algorithm as g, along with the other facts given above, proves that Algorithm 2 is secure.
Overall k-means algorithm
We now analyze the security of the entire k-means algorithm. In every iteration, the following things are revealed to the parties:
• Each party's local share of the k cluster means.
• The cluster assignment for every point.
These values are the desired result of the final iteration. Since it is impossible to know in advance the number of iterations required to halt, the number of iterations needs to be accepted as part of the final output. The results from the intermediate iterations may be used to infer information beyond this result. For example, if the cluster centers for site j do not change between iterations, and a point moves between two clusters, site j knows that those two clusters are both relatively close to the point across the sum of the other sites. However, since the location of the point in the other dimensions is not known, this information is of little use. In any iteration the final assignment of points to clusters is the same for every party. If this intermediate assignment should not be revealed, either a genuine third party will be required or else the algorithm will be quite inefficient. Allowing the intermediate results to be accepted as part of overall results allows an efficient algorithm with provable security properties. Forbidding knowledge of intermediate results would prevent each site from computing the next iteration locally, making the entire computation much more expensive.
We therefore state the proven overall security properties in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 1 is a private algorithm computing the k clusters of the combined data set, revealing at most the point assignment to clusters at each iteration and the number of iterations required to converge.
Proof. All of the communication in Algorithm 1 all occurs in the calls to Algorithms 3 and 2. The results of Algorithm 3 are point assignments to clusters, and can be simulated from the known result for that iteration. The results of Algorithm 2 are easily simulated; for all but the final iteration it returns false, in the final iteration it returns true. Applying the composition theorem shows that within the defined bounds the k-means algorithm is secure.
HANDLING COLLUSION
Parties P1, and Pr have more information than the others during the execution of the above algorithm. Specifically, P1 knows 1. the permutation π, and 2. the values of the random splits (i.e., the random matrix V k×r ).
Pr learns 1. the permuted result vectors of the permutation algorithm ( Ti) for all the parties other than P2, and 2. the comparison results.
(Note that P2 also learns the comparison results.) While we have proven that this information is meaningless in isolation, collusion between P1 and Pr provides enough information to derive the distances between each point and each party's means. It is necessary to carefully select these two parties so that all parties are confident the two will not collude. The assumption of non-collusion is often implicitly made in the real world. For example, take the case of lawyers for parties on opposite sides in court. While no technical means prevent collusion, safeguards exist in the form of severe punishments for breaking this rule as well as the business penalty of lost reputation. Similar legal and reputation safeguards could be enforced for privacy-preserving data mining. In addition, if there were not at least two parties who did not want to share information, there would be no need for a secure algorithm. Since collusion between P1 and Pr reveals P1's information to Pr, P1 would be unlikely to collude simply out of self-interest.
However, technical solutions are more satisfying. Let p, 1 ≤ p ≤ r − 1, be a user defined anti-collusion security parameter. We present a modification of the algorithm that guarantees that at least p + 1 parties need to collude to disclose additional information. The problem is in Algorithm 3. The key idea is that stage 1 is run p times, each time selecting a new party to act as P1. Thus, the permutation π and the random matrix V k×r is different for every run, however the row sum of each V matrix is 0, so the total sum is still the actual distance. In stage 4, to get the true index from the permuted index, the p parties apply their inverse permutations in order. Thus, the true index is π −1
COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS
We give a bottom-up analysis of the communication cost of one iteration of the algorithm. The total cost is dependent on the number of iterations required to converge, which is dependent on the data. Assume r parties, n data elements, and that encrypted distances can be represented in m bits.
The permutation algorithm requires only two rounds of communication. For length-n vectors, the total bit cost is 2n * m + public key size = O(n) bits.
The secure add and compare algorithm is a two party protocol, implemented using secure circuit evaluation. There are several general techniques for implementing circuit evaluation that optimize different parameters such as computation cost, communication cost (number of rounds or total number of bits), etc. The basic tool used, one out of two oblivious transfer, can also be implemented in several ways. Methods exist that require a constant number of rounds of communication (by parallelizing the oblivious transfers) with bit communication cost linear in the number of gates in the circuit. An excellent survey is given in [12] . The secure add and compare algorithm requires two addition circuits and one comparison circuit, all of m = log n bits (where n is based on the resolution of the distance). Both addition and comparison require a number of gates that is linear in m. Therefore this step requires a constant number of rounds and O(m) bits of communication.
In Algorithm 3, closest cluster, communication occurs in several places. Steps 4−5 make r−1 calls to the permutation algorithm with size k vectors. Steps 10 − 11 require r − 2 rounds of communication and (r−2) * k * m bits. Steps 17−18 use k − 1 calls to the secure add and compare algorithm. Steps 24 − 25 require two rounds with O(r log k) bit cost. Thus the total cost is 2(r − 1) + r − 2 + (k − 1) * const ≈ 3r + const * k = O(r + k) rounds and 2k * m * (r − 1) + k * m * (r −2)+(k −1) * const * (log n) ≈ 3 * m * kr +kc log n = O(kr) bits.
The collusion resistant variant of Section 4 multiplies the cost of steps 4 − 5 and step 24 by a factor of p. This gives O(pr + k) rounds and O(pkr) bits.
We now give a communication analysis of Algorithm 2.
Step 10 involves r−1 rounds of communication, with bit cost (r−1) * m. Step 14 makes one call to secure add and compare, for constant rounds and O(m) bits. Thus, the total cost is O(r) rounds and O(rm) bits.
Finally, we come to the analysis of the entire algorithm. We do not count any setup needed to decide the ordering or role of the parties. One iteration of the k-means algorithm requires one call to the closest cluster computation for every, point and one call to the checkT hreshold algorithm. Since all points can be processed in parallel, the total number of rounds required is O(r + k). The bit communication cost is O(nrk).
Optimizations
The cost of secure comparisons in Stage 3 of Algorithm 3 can be eliminated with a security compromise that would often be innocuous. First, the random vector generated in step 2 is generated so the rows sum to randomly chosen r instead of 0. In Stage 2, all parties (including P2) send their permuted vectors to Pr. Now Pr can independently find the index of the row with the minimum row sum. Thus, the communication cost is 2(r − 1) + r − 1 + 2 ≈ 3r = O(r) rounds and 2k * m * (r − 1) + k * m * (r − 1) + 2(log k) ≈ 3krm bits.
The problem with this approach is that Pr learns the relative distance of a point to each cluster, i.e., it learns that p is 15 units farther from the second nearest cluster than from the cluster it belongs to. It does not know which cluster the second nearest is. Effectively, it gets k equations (one for each cluster) in k + 1 unknowns. (The unknowns are the location of the point, the location of all clusters but the one it belongs in, and the distance to the closest cluster center.) Since the permutation of clusters is different for each point, as is the random R, combining information from multiples points still does not enable solving to find the exact location of a point or cluster. However, probabilistic estimates on the locations of points/clusters are possible. If the parties are willing to accept this loss of security in exchange for the communication efficiency, they can easily do so.
Let us now compare our communication cost with that of the general circuit evaluation method. For one iteration of the algorithm a circuit evaluation would be required for each point to evaluate the cluster to which the point is assigned. Even with an optimized circuit, the closest cluster computation requires at least r − 1 addition blocks for each cluster. I.e., it requires approximately kr addition circuits, and k − 1 comparison blocks. These blocks are all of width at least m bits. The best known general method still requires at least r 2 bits of communication for every circuit. Thus, a lower bound on the amount of bits transferred is O(kmr 3 ) bits. A simple upper bound on non-secure distributed k-means is obtained by having every party send its data to one site. This gives O(n) bits in one round. Privacy is adding a factor of O(r+k) rounds and O(rk) bit communication cost. While this tradeoff may seem expensive, if the alternative is not to perform data mining at all, it seems quite reasonable.
CONCLUSIONS
There has been work in distributed clustering that does not consider privacy issues, e.g., [6, 19] . Generally, the goal of this work is to reduce communication cost. The idea is to find important data points or patterns locally and utilize these to compute the global patterns. However, sharing local patterns inherently compromises privacy. Our work ensures reasonable privacy while limiting communication cost.
There recently been a surge in interest in privacy-preserving data mining. One approach is to add "noise" to the data before the data mining process, and using techniques that mitigate the impact of the noise from the data mining results [2, 1, 10, 27] .
The approach of protecting privacy of distributed sources was first addressed for the construction of decision trees [22] . This work closely followed the secure multiparty computation approach discussed below, achieving "perfect" privacy, i.e., nothing is learned that could not be deduced from one's own data and the resulting tree. The key insight was to trade off computation and communication cost for accuracy, improving efficiency over the generic secure multiparty computation method. There has since been work to address association rules in horizontally partitioned data [17, 16] , EM Clustering in Horizontally Partitioned Data [21] , association rules in vertically partitioned data [28] , and generalized approaches to reducing the number of "on-line" parties required for computation [18] . While some of this work makes trade-offs between efficiency and information disclosure, all maintain provable privacy of individual information and bounds on disclosure, and disclosure is limited to information that is unlikely to be of practical concern.
Clustering in the presence of differing scales, variability, correlation and/or outliers can lead to unintuitive results if an inappropriate space is used. Research has developed robust space transformations that permit good clustering in the face of such problems [20] . Such estimators need to be calculated over the entire data. An important extension to our work would be to allow privacy preserving computation of such estimators, giving higher confidence in clustering results. Similarly, extending this work to the more robust EM -clustering algorithm [5, 23] under the heterogeneous database model is a promising future direction. Another problem is to find the set of common entities without revealing the identity of entities that are not common to all parties.
We have made use of several primitives from the Secure Multiparty Computation literature. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in this field, a good discussion can be found in [8] . Currently, assembling these into efficient privacypreserving data mining algorithms, and proving them secure, is a challenging task. Our paper has demonstrated how these can be combined to implement a standard data mining algorithm with provable privacy and information disclosure properties. Our hope is that as the library of primitives and known means for using them grow, standard methods will develop to ease the task of developing privacy-preserving data mining techniques.
